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THREE DEFINITIONS AND ONE HYPOTHESIS
BEFORE entering into the substance of our subject it
would be useful to define three terms which appear in this article and which
bear differing connotations in the writings of political scientists working in
the field of international organization. These are: integration, international
secretariat, and executive action.
Though it may be surprising that we have chosen to study the action of
the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in terms of
its contribution to the integration of a regional system as heterogeneous as that
of Europe taken as a whole, we have for the purposes of this article defined
the term integration in a manner making it operationally applicable to dia-
metrically opposed systemic and institutional situations. With the exception
of some references in the works of Ernst Haas,1 integration has been consid-
ered since the Schuman declaration of 1950 to be the objective as well as the
JEAN SIOTIS is an Associate Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, and a
consultant for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article is to a large extent the
outcome of research on multilateral diplomacy which was conducted under the direction of Jacques
Freymond between 1959 and 1963 at the Graduate Institute. The author would like to express his
gratitude to all those, including the officers of the Economic Commission for Europe, who offered their
assistance and advice.
1
 See, in particular, his article "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,"
International Organization, Summer 1961 (Vol. 15, No. 3), pp. 366—392, and his forthcoming volume
Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford
University Press, 1965), 485 pp.
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178 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
process dominant in the relations among the countries which are members
of the European Community's institutions. In the same vein, some timid at-
tempts have been made to use this term in respect to the patterns of relations
among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
it has been proposed by some optimists as an objective for the Atlantic Alli-
ance. To those who have gradually accepted the idea that there is a causal
relationship between this process and the Western European subsystem it will
be surprising indeed to see this same term used to describe a process which,
potentially at least, occurs within the framework of any and all international
systems and subsystems.
For the purposes of a comparative study of international institutions we
would suggest then the following definition: Integration occurs when consen-
sus formation tends to become the dominant characteristic of relations among
actors in a system?
The term international secretariat became part of the vocabulary in the
field of international relations during and immediately after the period of the
League of Nations and particularly after it was used by Egon RanshofTen-
Wertheimer writing on the League Secretariat.3 Without going into details
we should simply note that the development of contemporary forms of inter-
national organization has been accompanied by a correlative development
of international bodies which have a distinct existence within a given system
of multilateral diplomacy and which exercise administrative and/or executive
functions, implicitly recognized or explicitly entrusted to them by the actors
of the international system. The composition of these bodies may be national,
multinational, or international, but their functions are always international in
character.
Such secretariats may assume an infinite variety of tasks but we limit our
present discussion to those which may be included under the general heading
of executive action. The term "executive" as used in this context describes the
functions of an international body acting independently within certain legisla-
tive limits and participating in the processes leading to the adoption of deci-
sions or assuming itself the decision-making function.
Finally, we would like to add that one of the hypotheses underlying this
2
 This definition is based on the following description of the integrative process which appears in
an unpublished document recently prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
In considering a possible conceptual framework one is inevitably led to the work of Karl Deutsch
and Ernst Haas on the integrative process either through a conscious effort at community build-
ing or through the unplanned growth of coincidence of interest. The integrative process as we
use the term here might roughly be defined as that in which consensus formation tends to
become the dominant characteristic of relations among actors in a system. This process finds
institutional expression, according to the well-known thesis of Haas, when the dominant method
of settling disputes among the members of an organization is by upgrading the common interest.
3
 For a general discussion of the problems related to an international secretariat, see Jean Siotis,
Essai sur le secretariat international (Publications de l'lnstitut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Inter-
nationales) (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963), 273 pp.
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THE ECE SECRETARIAT AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 179
brief presentation is that the primary function of any international institu-
tion4 and more specifically of those bodies which we classify under the head-
ing of international secretariats is to contribute to the process of integration
of the international system.5 It follows, however, that the corollary of this
hypothesis is that institutions may become dysfunctional and thus act as a
disintegrating factor within the system. It should also be added that, in the
last analysis, integration may occur at very different levels and it is the inten-
sity of the process and the quantitative impact of the objectives attained that
may bring about a "spillover," the crossing of the threshold from one level
to another. Such quantitative measurements must naturally be considered in
relation to the other variables which determine the nature and the activities
of international institutions and, in particular, to the state of the system. The
measurement of the relative contribution of an international secretariat to the
integrative process must then take into consideration the state of the system
and particularly the degree of its cohesion.
THE SYSTEMIC SETTING
The remarks which follow cover essentially the practice of the Secretariat of
ECE during the first ten years of its existence (1947-1957) though many of
the conclusions we will draw from this practice are still perfectly valid. The
reasons for concentrating on this initial period are numerous, but they can be
well summarized in a quotation from Ernst Haas' forthcoming volume on
functionalism and international organization:
Certain kinds of organization experience acquire the importance of key determi-
nants of maintenance, expansion and value infusion: the ability to use a crisis in
the relationship between organization and environment as an opportunity for
self-assessment and self-redefinition, to profit from critical experience, to have the
elite undergo growth in its character and understanding. To be sure, a "critical"
decision cannot always be differentiated from a "routine" one until the outcome
is known. The leadership may not consciously know that it is making a critical
decision. A functional theory of international organization is the more useful,
then, in calling attention to the unintended integrative consequences. The decision
will nevertheless be "critical" if it engenders a new affirmation of organizational
4
 The term "function" as used in this context should be distinguished from the intended purpose of
an institution as expressed in its constitution or in subsequent resolutions. The functions and the in-
tended purposes may, but do not necessarily, coincide.
5
 The definition of this term which we proposed earlier should be qualified at this stage by indicating
our view that the range of particular sectors of interstate relations which are affected by the integrative
processes occurring in the international system is proportionate to the degree of homogeneity of the
system. The high degree of homogeneity is not only conducive to an intensive process of integration but
also to the horizontal extension of the range of sectors of interstate relations where these processes
occur, while in a heterogeneous system the integrative processes occur, with varying intensity, in certain
limited sectors of interstate relations. Finally, we consider that the processes of integration and dis-
integration always occur simultaneously and that they are simply the two dialectical opposites of inter-
actor relations in all international systems.
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l 8 o INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
objectives under challenge from hostile or cross-cutting environmental pressures,
if it thereby strengthens the sense of purpose of the organization's staff at the
expense of environmental ties. But it is crucial to recall that unless die leadership
is willing to examine useless old objectives and strike out in new directions with
a revalued body of aims, it will merely reaffirm the stale old pattern, it will remain
mired in routine.6
In our view the first ten years of the ECE experience represent a fertile
field of inquiry because of the permanent crisis of the European system which
was characteristic of that period and of the quality of Secretariat leadership
which made it possible for the organization to use the crisis as "an opportunity
for self-assessment and self-redefinition." It is the combination of these two
elements, the systemic setting and the quality of leadership, which makes
this period particularly interesting for those working in the field of interna-
tional organization.
This initial period was characterized by a series of profound changes in the
state of the European system, and it is most revealing to study the reaction of
an international secretariat to these systemic changes as well as its perform-
ance as an actor in a limited sector of the system. The evolution of the Euro-
pean regional system during that period placed a tremendous strain on the
solidity and threatened the very existence of institutions such as ECE, whose
primary function was the reconstruction and progressive integration of a
region torn by political, ideological, and economic strife and which on more
than one occasion found itself on the verge of violent armed conflicts. These
strains were felt by the United Nations as a whole, but it was Europe which
became the scene of the sharpest oppositions between the two camps during
the earlier part of the Cold War, and it is only natural that a European re-
gional body, such as ECE, felt the strains of disintegration and conflict in a
particularly acute manner.
On the eve of the establishment of ECE the state of the European regional
system could be roughly described as follows:7 i) The field of the regional
system had remained unchanged, and its boundaries were not affected by the
war. However, the degree of subordination of the system to the universal
international system had greatly increased. In relation to the 1930's it was
obvious that Europe had lost its dominant position within the international
system and that it had become, momentarily at least, a secondary, highly
subordinate regional system. 2) With regard to the actors in the system, the
temporary disappearance of Germany as a major actor, the return to the fore-
front of the Soviet Union, and the newly assumed role of the United States as
6
 Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, Chapter 4.
7
 For the purposes of this article it may be useful to indicate that we consider that the state of an
international system is determined by the following dependent variables: 1) the field of the system;
2) the identity of the actors in the system; 3) the hierarchy which determines interactor relations; 4)
the means and content of interactor communications; and 5) the degree of homogeneity of the system.
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THE ECE SECRETARIAT AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION l 8 l
one of the two most important actors in Europe brought about some drastic
changes in the systemic environment. In addition, the revolutionary trends
within the national boundaries of a great number of European states created
a new and potentially revolutionary situation within the system taken as a
whole. 3) The nature of the Second World War and the "great leap forward"
in military technology which was its immediate consequence gave birth to
new power relations which in turn modified the hierarchy of interactor rela-
tions. The loose equilibrium of the prewar period was replaced by an increas-
ingly bipolarized system, with both poles assuming worldwide responsibilities
while, however, one of them was a geographically extra-European power.
4) After an initial stage of emergency reconstruction, the means of peace-
time communications returned to their pre-1939 state and began very soon to
develop at an impressive pace. Parallel to this development, however, the
content of interactor communications reflected progressively and to a very
high degree the process of disintegration which characterized the system from
1946 to 1953-1954. 5) As a result of these changes in the other systemic varia-
bles the degree of the region's cohesion fell to a dangerously low point during
that period, and its high heterogeneity by the end of the 1940's seemingly
justified those who pressed for the recognition that the European system had
come to an end and that henceforth the existence of two distinct and mutually
hostile subsystems had to be accepted as a permanent factor in European
politics.
It would then be a euphemism to state that the Economic Commission for
Europe was established under conditions which were not particularly favorable
to the attainment of the objectives set forth in its Terms of Reference.8 In
the context of the resolutions concerning ECE adopted by the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) Europe was considered as a region and ECE was
established as a body committed to cooperation among its members and ulti-
mately to the progressive integration of the system at the level of interactor
economic relations.9 Given the blatant contradiction between systemic condi-
8
 UN Document E/ECE/291, Appendix A. ECE was established under Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) Resolution 36 (IV) of March 28, 1947.
9
 Although the term "integration" was not used in the Commission's Terms of Reference, the various
interpretations of the Terms by the Executive Secretary contain sufficient indications that in fact the
ultimate aim of ECE was to promote integration as we defined it earlier in this article. As an example
we can cite Gunnar Myrdal's statement on August 3, 1954, when, during the 825th meeting of ECO-
SOC's eighteenth session, he told delegates:
Our Inland Transport Committee is proud of the fact that it has been the centre for practically
all the real work of European integration in the transport field accomplished since the war.
Similar statements were made by the Executive Secretary on many occasions, particularly in regard to
the activities of the Coal Committee and the various initiatives of the Secretariat in the field of intra-
European trade. In his Hobhouse Lecture Myrdal spoke in fact of integration when he told his audience:
If national propaganda, plus some sort of research and, more generally, the contacts made possi-
ble on different levels between government officials which serve as a clearing system for ideas
and information represent the minimum level of national policy interests of the individual govern-
ments in upholding international organizations, the maximum level is naturally the reaching of
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182 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
tions and institutional functions, it would have been perfectly normal if under
the circumstances the Commission had turned out to be a stillborn body or one
condemned to the role of a passive observer of the region's disintegration. This
did not happen, however, and the Commission was able during the "difficult
years" to carry out at least some of its functions and to set such precedents as
to make it, in many respects, the prototype on which were subsequently based
the other ECOSOC regional commissions as well as many of the institutional
practices which characterize contemporary international organization.
The reasons for this remarkable achievement are to be found in the original
impetus given to the Commission by its Secretariat working under the direc-
tion of Gunnar Myrdal. The "leadership" role assumed by the first Executive
Secretary and its impact on the "style" and the content of the Commission's
activities have been in the past and are still the object of controversy within
the United Nations as well as in the academic circles interested in these mat-
ters. To be sure, many of Myrdal's initiatives have become the object of harsh
criticism, but it would be very difficult to question the assertion that ECE
survived its initial period largely as a result of these initiatives. This criticism
is the price the Secretariat has had to pay for the relevance of its action. Never-
theless, it is of little importance for this short study whether or not Europe
and the United Nations benefited from this executive action; we should sim-
ply note the fact of this survival as well as some of its consequences on the
development of European cooperation and, in some respects, on the integra-
tive processes which reappeared in the European system during the second
half of the first ten-year period.
SOME PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE SECRETARIAT'S ACTION
The ECE Secretariat was able to give a constantly renewed impetus to the
work of the Commission basically because it remained firmly attached to the
following four closely interrelated sets of principles:
Firstly, Europe is a region and ECE is an organ of the United Nations
whose function is to serve and to contribute to the integration of the entire
region. "This Commission is an all-European body," Myrdal told delegates
to the fourth session of the Commission before warning them against the
consequences of it being transformed into an all-Western body.10 Three years
later, when drawing the conclusions from the seventh session, the Executive
Secretary repeated:
agreements on concerted action. . . . Reaching this higher level of international co-operation as-
sumes a political process where in the end the individual governments choose to agree on some-
thing of material interest.
(Realities and Illusions in Regard to Inter-Governmental Organizations [L. T. Hobhouse Memorial
Trust Lecture, No. 24] [London: Oxford University Press, 1955], p. 7.)
10
 Opening statement of the Executive Secretary on May 9, 1949, to the fourth session of ECE, p. 14.
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THE ECE SECRETARIAT AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 183
In the course of your Session, I rather bluntly stated as a fact that our Committees
are gradually being transformed into purely Western bodies—perhaps I should
more adequately say non-Eastern European bodies. This situation is, to say the
least, awkward for all of you, and it is not tenable.11
A year later, the Executive Secretary addressed an even stronger warning to
participating governments:
But permit me to stress that the Commission cannot be preserved merely as an
empty structure with the sole purpose and function that it constitutes a reserve
for the future. The Commission can exist only as long as active committees and
working parties provide the indispensable under-structure. I am addressing this
warning primarily to the East but also to the West. The Commission is a tech-
nical instrument which the United Nations, at considerable costs, have placed at
the disposal of the governments in this region. It is an instrument for intergovern-
mental co-operation; and only on the condition that this instrument is usefully
employed for its purposes by the governments in the region can the United
Nations decision to create and maintain the Commission, and defray its costs, be
justified.12
Such statements, accompanied by untiring pressure on governments, and
the practice based on the principle that no meeting is better than a bad or
insufficiently prepared meeting indicate clearly that the ECE Secretariat
viewed the European scene during the period of acute Cold War as being an
"abnormal" phenomenon which had to be counteracted by the relentless ef-
forts and the well-prepared initiatives of the Secretariat. Today, such a view
may appear as perfectly logical and in accordance with the realities of the
European system. In the early fifties, however, the whole structure of the UN—
and this included to a large extent the Secretariat—was undergoing deep
modifications with the more or less avowed aim of turning the Organization
into a weapon to be used by the majority in the struggle opposing it to the
small pro-Soviet minority. At the same time most European governments
had gladly or grudgingly accepted the new situation and were planning their
future economic relations in terms of a permanent division of Europe.
Gunnar Myrdal's positions were thus sharply divergent from the general
tendencies which characterized the years 1948-1953; and it is our view that
it was precisely his stubborn refusal to accept what he considered to be a tem-
porary aberration in intra-European relations as the new systemic setting on
which the regional institutions should be founded that contributed largely
to the survival of ECE. This refusal at times led to a distorted attitude toward
the subsystemic institutions which were established in the early fifties. The
ECE Secretariat often adopted a critical, if not hostile, approach to these new
institutions because it held the firm belief that Europe objectively represented
11
 UN Document E/ECE/i48, p. 2.
12
 UN Document E/EGE/159, p. 5.
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
00
00
26
17
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
29
:5
4,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
184 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
an economic region and that it was the Commission's duty to resist the "artifi-
cial" barriers which were being erected as a result of essentially political moti-
vations. Nevertheless, no matter how controversial it appeared at the time,
it was this attitude which constituted the major driving force for the attain-
ment of the objectives laid down in the Commission's Terms of Reference.
Secondly, the Secretariat always insisted that the
Economic Commission is not primarily a forum for economic discussion. As its
Terms of Reference show, it was intended to become an operational instrument
for the reconstruction and development of die European economy, and, under
very difficult circumstances, its technical Committees and their sub-Committees
and working parties, have endeavoured to function as such within their limited
fields.13
These operational tasks were to be carried out by bodies composed of govern-
ment delegates and national experts, but when they are unable to function or
when they reach deadlocks, it becomes the duty of the Secretariat to assume
the initiative either on procedural or on substantive matters. The Secretariat's
initiatives can be negative—by deciding to postpone or to cancel meetings of
multilateral bodies—or positive—by proposing alternative solutions based on
the principle of "upgrading the common interests" or by tackling collateral
problems which seem more likely to find a successful solution.
The view of the Commission's role held by the Secretariat was such that
under no circumstances could it become the passive observer of the multi-
lateral bodies' inaction; and if we consider that the Commission had primarily
operational functions, this implied a commitment to executive action under-
taken by the Secretariat whenever the multilateral bodies were unable to
act. This dynamic view of its functions enabled the Secretariat to move for-
ward during the "lean years" and contribute to the progressive integration
of some limited sectors of the European economy.
Thirdly,
it is indicative of the nature of inter-governmental organizations that on more
substantive issues voting has no . . . significance. No important political and
economic problems can be solved in an inter-governmental organization by a
majority vote. A vote, if it is taken, must remain a demonstration. The demonstra-
tion may occasionally have an importance as an immediate political pressure upon
the minority group of state governments to conform; more often a resolution
voted has only a propaganda importance with its possible political effects much
weaker and located in a more distant future.14
This minimization of voting procedures for the solution of substantive prob-
lems is a corollary to the views held by the Secretariat of its functions and the
13
 Opening statement of the Executive Secretary on May 9, 1949, to the fourth session of ECE, p. 1.
14
 Myrdal, Realities and Illusions in Regard to Inter-Governmental Organizations, p. 6.
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THE ECE SECRETARIAT AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 185
systemic environment of the Commission. Considering the heterogeneity of
the system and the type of functions entrusted to the Commission, voting on
substantive issues would inevitably have become a meaningless exercise which
would have simply exacerbated the already existing opposition.
Such a stand, taken repeatedly by the head of one of the units of the UN
Secretariat at a time when the majority within the Organization was attempt-
ing to turn the multilateral organs into "voting machines," was indeed a strik-
ing expression of Myrdal's adherence to a set of principles which were borne
out by the day-to-day practice of ECE. One may question the first Executive
Secretary's positions on the nature and desirable development of the European
system and its economy as well as his interpretation of the Commission's
Terms of Reference. If these are accepted, however, it only follows that the
adoption and implementation of decisions by the competent Commission
bodies cannot possibly be the result of majority votes whose only real value
lies in the realm of propaganda.
Finally, the enumeration of the principles on which the action of the ECE
Secretariat rested during the first ten years would be incomplete if we did
not consider the principle of its independence as understood and implemented
by Gunnar Myrdal. The theory and practice of an independent international
secretariat, as understood by the first Executive Secretary, did not have any
of the quixotic and totally unrealistic qualities which characterize so much of
the literature devoted to this subject since i960. Quite to the contrary, they
were founded on a realistic appraisal of the potential of contemporary inter-
national organization and certainly found their justification in the daily ex-
perience of ECE.
The general principle that the international organizations are nothing more
than an instrument, created by agreement between governments, for their national
policies . . . is not invalidated by the fact that certain functions and, therefore,
certain powers are collectively delegated. In every organization which is not en-
tirely futile the secretariat is awarded such functions and powers. There are, of
course, great differences in the degree of delegation—differences that are, as a
matter of fact, not closely related to constitutional rules but more to practices as
they develop and gradually acquire the character of common law. Favourable
factors for the development of a wide area of delegation of functions in the secre-
tariat are the presence in the particular case of a certain workable minimum of
interest convergence between the governments in some well-defined issues and
also naturally the degree of confidence the secretariat has secured among the
governments.15
This quotation expresses quite clearly Myrdal's views on the exact position
of an international secretariat within the framework of contemporary inter-
national organization. For our present purposes we shall note particularly
15
 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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l 8 6 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
the statement that the delegation of powers is dependent on "the degree of
confidence the secretariat has secured among the governments." Within the
limits of this article we are in no position to discuss at any length the means
used by the first Executive Secretary in order to secure and to maintain the
confidence of member governments. We would nevertheless like to under-
line the fact that all of the Secretariat's activities were and still are based on
the assumption that without such confidence it would become completely
ineffective although this never meant a subordination of these activities to the
whimsies or even to well-orchestrated political pressures by member govern-
ments. The degree of independence, both with regard to its functions and to
its structure, which the ECE Secretariat has allowed itself has varied consid-
erably from time to time and from one field of activity to another. As we
shall see later, the Research and Planning Division because of the very nature
of its work was allowed considerable freedom in the implementation of its
tasks as well as in its composition, while the office of the Executive Secretary,
which has been more directly involved in the diplomatic and policy-making
activities of the Commission, has always been composed on the basis of the
principle of geographic distribution and its action has always heeded its
founder's warning that "the basis of courage must be caution" and that it
should "watch its steps carefully so that it does not wander off outside the
field where it can safely count on backing by the governments."16
Underlying this thesis is the conviction often expressed that the Secretariat
is the collective servant of certain common interests,17 and the means used by
an international secretariat to serve them are dependent on the extent and the
intensity of these interests. It follows then that caution on the part of the Secre-
tariat must be proportionate to the importance of these common interests in
the conduct of the multilateral relations between member governments of a
given international body. This principle has general validity for international
secretariats but its successful implementation is a particular characteristic of
the Economic Commission for Europe.
Before ending this section we would like to add some remarks relating
these principles to the overall picture of the UN Secretariat. The Executive
Secretary of ECE has always insisted that his staff is but a unit within the
UN Secretariat's Department of Economic and Social Affairs. In doing this
he has simply repeated the relevant provisions of the Terms of Reference and
the numerous administrative rules which have been formulated by the com-
petent Secretariat authorities. It would, however, be misleading to consider
that the style of work as well as the general orientation of the ECE staff when
carrying out executive activities have consistently reflected the general ten-
1 8
 Ibid., p. 22.
17
 In his opening statement on May 9, 1949, to the fourth session of ECE the Executive Secretary
told delegates: "I can only speak as the servant of you all and as a technical representative of your
common interests."
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dencies characteristic of the UN Secretariat at Headquarters. Distance, the
nature of the tasks with which it has been entrusted, and the personality of
the first Executive Secretary have decisively influenced the style and content
of the work of the ECE unit. This "particularism" of ECE has often been
the source of misunderstandings and even of serious administrative difficul-
ties, but it has also enabled its Secretariat to maintain a remarkably high level
of cohesion, competence, efficiency, and political effectiveness, and the measure
of its success should be seriously considered by those who study the problems
of decentralization in international organization. In this respect it should also
be remembered that the ECE staff was one of the rare units of the UN Secre-
tariat which was effectively "shielded" when the McCarthyite inquisition was
given a well-nigh free hand at Headquarters.
This relative autonomy is one of the principal reasons for the high level
of loyalty which has been developed within the ECE Secretariat and which
has stood up—alongside the principle of independence—against repeated at-
tacks from member governments desirous of exerting an unjustifiedly high
degree of influence through pressure on the Executive Secretary with regard
to matters of personnel. On the whole, we can safely state that the ECE prac-
tice reflects a happy balance between caution and confidence on the one hand
and loyalty and independence on the other.
SOME EXAMPLES OF.EXECUTIVE ACTION
Earlier in this article we defined the term "executive action" by relating it
to the process of reaching decisions within a given system of multilateral diplo-
macy.18 This brief and preliminary survey does not permit us to discuss in any
detail the role of the ECE Secretariat in the decision-making processes which
occur in the Commission and its subsidiary organs. In the next few pages we
shall simply mention the principal fields of ECE activities where such execu-
tive action has been carried out in the past and where the Secretariat has built
up a "tradition" which should be taken very seriously into consideration when
we discuss the role of international secretariats in relation to integration.
The Secretariat and the Subsidiary Multilateral Bodies
One of the principal duties of any international administration naturally is
to prepare and service the meetings of intergovernmental bodies. Under cer-
tain systemic and institutional conditions, however, international secretariats
generally extend their action into fields which are reserved to the sole compe-
tence of the intergovernmental bodies themselves. In some cases this practice
18
 See above, p. 178. We have chosen to concentrate on the Secretariat's participation in decision
making because this aspect of its executive action is the most controversial. In the case of ECE the im-
plementation by the Secretariat of decisions adopted by the multilateral bodies has never become the
object of great controversy.
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188 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
has been codified in the constitutional documents of such bodies or in subse-
quent resolutions, adding to the traditional administrative functions of inter-
national secretariats' executive functions which enable them at times to assume
the role of actors in the international system. In the absence of such explicit
texts, the practice of contemporary international organization offers numerous
examples in which the secretariats' executive functions have been developed
on the basis of one or more permissive texts and their implicit acceptance by
member governments.
In the particular case of ECE its Terms of Reference as well as those of its
committees are not very explicit concerning the role of the Secretariat; and
Article 19 of the Rules of Procedure simply empowers the Executive Secre-
tary to take part in all discussions in the Commission and the subsidiary or-
gans. The evolution of the European regional system in the early postwar
years and the particular views on their role held by Myrdal and many of the
senior members of his staff made it necessary for them in their day-to-day
activities to go beyond the bounds of these texts and assume an increasing
amount of responsibility in the settlement of substantive problems which
came before the Commission and the subsidiary organs. The tasks which were
thus developed in practice fall under three main categories:
1) The preparation of the multilateral meetings from a substantive point
of view. With some very rare exceptions no meeting has ever been held under
the auspices of the Commission without thorough preparation, technical as
well as political, in which the Secretariat has always assumed the principal role.
Very often, the preparation of the more formal meetings of ECE committees
or subcommittees takes place with the assistance of working parties or individ-
ual experts brought together at the invitation of the Executive Secretary, but
the leading role has in fact always been assumed by the staff which "sets the
tone" for the work of such groups. The preparation of these meetings in-
volves a certain number of purely administrative tasks which are handled by
the general conference services of the European Office of the United Nations,
and the work of the ECE unit is essentially devoted to research on the ques-
tions which are under discussion and to exploratory diplomatic contacts ena-
bling the Executive Secretary to formulate a valid opinion on the positions
of member governments. These contacts also enable the Secretariat to clarify
the issues under discussion before the meetings convene.
The formal contribution of the Secretariat to this preparation usually takes
the form of the submission of studies, reports, or working papers which serve
as the basis for the multilateral discussions. It has been the constant practice
of the Secretariat to offer member governments its services by preparing such
documents, but it has often refused to draft reports if it did not receive rea-
sonable assurance that they would be discussed by the competent intergovern-
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mental bodies. As an example of this attitude we can cite the statement by
Gunnar Myrdal at the fourth session of the Industry and Materials Committee
in 1950 when he told delegates that the Secretariat was not willing to prepare
reports which were never discussed by the Committee.
The diplomatic techniques used by the Secretariat in the course of prepara-
tion of meetings have varied greatly. The presence of permanent delegations
in Geneva renders such contacts relatively easy, but on many occasions the
Executive Secretary came to believe that contacts at a higher level were neces-
sary or that it was important to reach the competent technical ministries di-
rectly without necessarily availing himself of the normal diplomatic channels.
In such cases the Secretariat has never hesitated to send one or more of its
senior members on special missions or to correspond directly with the national
administrations in the respective capitals.19 This practice, it goes without say-
ing, has not always met with the approval of foreign ministries and on many
occasions the first Executive Secretary was very strongly criticized for ignoring
the permanent missions accredited to the UN's European Office.20
The active participation of the Secretariat in the preparation of meetings of
the Commission and subsidiary organs makes it possible for the staff to exert
at times a decisive influence during the early stages of the process leading to
the adoption of decisions. With the exception of the annual plenary session
of the Commission, meetings held under its auspices are usually of very short
duration and, as a result, it is only natural that most of the decisions adopted
conform generally to the suggestions put forth in the working papers.
2) The active role of the Secretariat on procedural matters. As we have
already seen,21 the ECE staff and, in particular, the first Executive Secretary
held some very definite views concerning the relative value of procedural
and, more specifically, parliamentary techniques when they were used to
further the aims of intergovernmental agencies. In practice the most com-
petent use of procedural techniques by the Secretariat has been an added
factor which we must take into consideration when we discuss its executive
action in relation to the subsidiary multilateral bodies. The extent of the Secre-
tariat's influence in these matters has been such that, with the exception of
the plenary sessions, all questions pertaining to procedure have come within
the purview of its competence and are handled as purely "technical" problems.
It is, for instance, the responsibility of the Secretariat to decide whether a
meeting of a subsidiary organ is to be convened. Naturally, before deciding
to act in such a case, the Secretariat consults member governments individ-
19
 The permanent missions in Geneva or the foreign ministries directly are naturally kept informed
of such initiatives, and copies of correspondence addressed to national administrations are always sent
to them.
20
 The United Kingdom has probably been the one Western country most reluctant to accept these
practices.
2 1
 See above, pp. 182-187.
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190 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
ually or at the annual sessions but the final decision rests with the Executive
Secretary, who has often taken the initiative to postpone temporarily or in-
definitely such meetings if he felt that they could serve no useful purpose.22
We can cite as examples the Committee on the Development of Trade which
did not meet between 1949 and 1954, the Manpower Committee which only
met once in 1948, and the Industry and Materials Committee which has not
met since 1950. In implementing this important function, the Secretariat has
always been careful to weigh its decisions and to take into consideration the
desires of governments, but it has rarely hesitated to state its views on these
matters even if they were not accepted by all member governments. Objections
to a procedural decision taken by the Secretariat have been raised time and
again by many important governments but, in the last analysis, it is the Execu-
tive Secretary who assumes the final responsibility in this field. The absence
of any rules of procedure for the subsidiary bodies clearly indicates that this
practice meets with the consensus as it has developed since 1947.
The unwritten rule of "no voting" on substantive issues in the subsidiary
organs gives an added weight to the role of the Secretariat because it is its
duty to draw the conclusions from these meetings. The informal character of
the process of consensus formation in the committees, subcommittees, and
working parties makes it necessary for the Secretariat to formulate its own
conclusions which are most often the only written record of the decisions
adopted and which in turn become the instructions for the staff during the
intervals between meetings. The importance of this function becomes even
more apparent when we take into consideration the element of permanence
which characterizes the Secretariat's participation in the work of the multi-
lateral bodies. Because of this continuity the members of the staff are in a
position to draw their conclusions in such a manner as to pursue a policy
aiming at the attainment of certain objectives formulated by the Secretariat.
On many occasions23 the policy pursued by the Secretariat through its participa-
tion in the work of the technical committees has met with very serious objec-
tions on the part of member governments which have resented the "slanted"
approaches adopted by the Secretariat in its studies as well as in the imple-
mentation of committee decisions. The interpretation of committee decisions
has been the object of controversy but, for our purposes, we would simply
note the fact that the "no voting" rule gives the Executive Secretary certain
discretionary powers which have been often used as tools with which to fur-
ther the aims of the Secretariat acting in an executive capacity.
22
 The Executive Secretary has from time to time taken the responsibility for calling off scheduled
meetings, or postponing them, when it was felt that they could not have yielded results important
enough to warrant the costs and work involved. The governments have always afforded the
Secretariat full backing in carrying out this responsibility.
(UN Document E/ECE/291, Chapter 1, p. 6.)
2 3
 Particularly in the cases of the Committee on the Development of Trade and of the Industry and
Materials Committee in 1949-1950.
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THE ECE SECRETARIAT AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION I9I
3) The Secretariat's participation in substantive discussions. Lastly, we
should mention the right of the Secretariat under Article 19 of the Rules of
Procedure to take part in all discussions which take place in the intergovern-
mental organs. This is a practice common to the United Nations as a whole,
but the nature of the topics which fall under the Commission's Terms of
Reference offers numerous possibilities to the members of the staff to inter-
vene in the debates and through such interventions to influence their general
course as well as their outcome. At times it also becomes most useful to have
the Secretariat make specific proposals which can be withdrawn without any
loss of prestige if they meet with serious opposition. This technique has been
used successfully on many occasions and it represents an added means at the
disposal of the Secretariat for taking part in the decision-making process.
Before concluding this section it would seem appropriate to underline the
importance of the work of the Secretariat in relation to the subsidiary bodies
by drawing attention to the fact that since 1947 their meetings have brought
together many thousands of delegates and experts. Over the past sixteen
years the committees, subcommittees, and working groups held a minimum
of 40 and a maximum of 160 meetings annually. Each meeting lasts several
days and the total number of delegates and experts who come to Geneva from
both Western and Eastern European countries varies from year to year, from
a minimum of 1,200 to a maximum of 4,ooo.24 The exchange of information,
the development of personal and official contacts, and the concerted action
that result from these meetings all bear the imprint of the particular "Geneva
atmosphere" which is largely the atmosphere created and maintained by the
Secretariat.
Research, Planning, and the Executive Action of the Secretariat
The work of the Research and Planning Division of the ECE Secretariat
has been repeatedly presented as the major justification for the existence of
the Commission during the "lean years" of the Cold War. Myrdal himself
often stated that the research work of the Secretariat was a sufficient raison
d'etre of the Commission though he always qualified such statements by add-
ing that research cannot remain divorced from operational realities for any
length of time without becoming sterile and meaningless. As a consequence,
this relationship between research and operational activities which was so im-
portant in Myrdal's view does not proceed from the same premises as aca-
demic research, and it should be noted that the very title of the Secretariat
division primarily responsible for research also includes the term "planning."
In scientific inquiry governments cannot be granted the monopoly of truth. This
implies, among other things, that official statistics and assertions by governments
24
 These figures were given to us by competent ECE officers in June 1964.
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192 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
about facts and causal relations, particularly as regards the international aspects
of questions, cannot be accepted on their face value, but have to be scrutinized in
a scholarly manner. This has also a most important corollary that it is not permis-
sible to eschew controversial issues. One of the easiest opportunistic adjustments
of economic research, which is not permissible according to the traditional stand-
ards of scientific enquiry, is the escape into insignificance by steering clear of
problems where political interests are powerful and by avoiding analytical infer-
ences when these are awkward. Naturally, a research organization like the ECE
Secretariat when it functions in that role . . . has a clearly practical purpose . . .
to serve the general aim of increasing rationality in die national and international
policies of member countries—and it will not for any lengdi of time be supported
if it is not reasonably effective in furthering diis specific purpose. . . . Scientific
activity in terms of Vart pour I'art—which should have its existence firmly guar-
anteed in a university operating widiin the scientific tradition—has no place in
this type of research organization, whose work must always be "practical" and
direcdy "useful."25
This long excerpt from the comprehensive report on the first ten years of
ECE activity presents very clearly Gunnar Myrdal's ideas on the function of
research carried out by the staff, and the practice of the Secretariat in this
field has been largely in conformity with the principles laid down by the first
Executive Secretary. Such research has been considered as a function of the
Secretariat acting independently and as a contribution to the formulation of
rational international and national policies. Its work in the field of research
can then be qualified as executive or quasi-executive action because it acts
independently within certain legislative limits—the Terms of Reference and
subsequent resolutions—and it participates in the processes leading to the
adoption of decisions, at the national and international levels.
The causal relationship between this research and decisions adopted by the
Commission's multilateral bodies as well as by other institutions both inside
and outside the United Nations family becomes apparent when one analyzes
the practices of such bodies. The controversial nature of some of the studies
produced by the Secretariat should not obscure the fact that from the very
beginning intergovernmental agencies of all types have regularly taken into
consideration the results of such studies before making decisions on problems
which have been the object of research by the ECE staff. In the limited con-
text of this paper we shall simply mention some characteristic examples in
which the research of the Secretariat was one of the factors which determined
the content of decisions adopted by intergovernmental bodies.
1) The first two annual Economic Surveys of Europe were the scientific
starting points from which proceeded the initial work of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in elaborating plans for the recon-
25
 UN Document E/ECE/291, Chapter 14, p. 1.
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THE ECE SECRETARIAT AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 193
struction and development of the national economies of member states. The
analyses and recommendations included in these reports—and particularly
those pertaining to the trade and payments problems—served as the bases for
many of the negotiations which led to the formulation by the competent
OEEC organs of the first "country plans." The importance of these studies
in the work of the economic policy makers is borne out by the fact that im-
mediately after their publication both were reproduced as supplements to the
U.S. Congressional Record because the Marshall Plan authorities were eager
to have them become available as widely and as rapidly as possible.
2) A little-known aspect of ECE activity is the work carried out at the re-
quest of the French government by the Steel Division of the Secretariat in
1948-1949 that served as the basis for much of the thinking which eventually
took the form of the Monnet-Schuman Plan for the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The principle underlying the
acceptance by the Executive Secretary of the French government's request is
"that the Secretariat is at the disposal of any member country or group of
member countries that wants assistance."26 Naturally, the Secretariat steered
clear of the political issues raised by the establishment of the Community, but
it should be remembered that the final decisions concerning ECSC were con-
tingent upon the previous solution of a number of very thorny economic,
institutional, and technical problems.
3) The Timber and Coal Committees of ECE, which have attempted and
sometimes succeeded in carrying out operational tasks in their respective fields,
have been largely dependent on Secretariat guidance in the determination of
trends, prospects, and specific recommendations to member countries or groups
of countries. The research work of both the operational divisions and the Re-
search and Planning Division has enabled the Commission staff to formulate
proposals which have served as the basis for the decisions adopted by the
Committees. In the case of the Coal Committee the value of the Secretariat's
contribution to the formulation of its policy was recognized when it was
given the specific task of modifying the agreed coal allocations in the intervals
between the Committee's meetings.27
To these could be added numerous other examples of the causal relation-
ship between research and policy decisions. A careful and systematic study
of this relationship would certainly enable us to understand more fully the
relevance of an international secretariat's action in the decision-making proc-
esses which occur within the framework of intergovernmental bodies.
2 6
 Ibid., p . 10.
2 7
 The assumption was that, on the basis of its intimate knowledge of the developments in the coal
market as well as the attitudes of the governments, the secretariat would make a decision closely
corresponding to the agreements the governments would have reached had they met for this
purpose.
(Myrdal, Realities and Illusions in Regard to Inter-Governmental Organizations, p . 23.)
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194 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
At times such research has also had a direct bearing on the formulation of
national policies. It has often been said that the real yardstick for measuring
the political effectiveness of international institutions is the extent of their
impact on the national decision-making processes, and the very rare studies
devoted to this question have yielded interesting enough results to warrant
further research.28 The impact of studies produced by the ECE Secretariat on
the formulation of national economic policies has not been negligible al-
though, as a general rule, national administrations are reluctant to recognize
the "international" origin or inspiration of decisions which they prefer to
present as the results of "brainstorms" or of careful elaboration on their own
part. In addition to the "quiet assimilation" of the results of such research in
the normal national decision-making processes, governments, administrations,
or simply political pressure groups and parties have occasionally chosen to
"use" these results for their own purposes. We know of at least one smaller
European country where the studies produced by the Secretariat have been
"used" by one ministry as weapons in a major policy controversy with another
government department. Even more so, however, in this same country the
press and, in particular, some of the more serious economic journals have
regularly referred to these studies when criticizing the government's policies.
One of the most pertinent examples of the impact of this research on na-
tional policies is the study on southern Europe which was part of the annual
Economic Survey of Europe in 7953. The realistic and thoroughly scientific
approach adopted by the staff in preparing this study at first provoked the
harsh criticism of a most heterogeneous constellation of governments. Never-
theless, it soon became apparent that the motivations of the Secretariat in
drafting this report did not proceed from any bias other than the ideological
and theoretical positions of its members, and at least two of the governments
whose policies were analyzed in the report revised, to a more or less large
extent, their immediate as well as their long-term policy objectives to meet
some of the ECE recommendations. In this respect it should also be added
that subsequent OEEC recommendations to member countries in the southern
European area were largely inspired by the findings of the ECE study.
Before concluding this section on the research activities of the ECE staff
and after having indicated that in carrying out these tasks the Secretariat pur-
sues a set of operationally oriented policy objectives, we are led to ask the
following question: How and by whom are these objectives determined?29
The answer to the second part of this question is to be found in many state-
ments in which the first Executive Secretary insisted that the final decisions
2 8
 We are thinking here in particular of the better volumes in the Carnegie Endowment series on
member states and the United Nations and of Max Beloff's work on the impact of international institu-
tions on British government and administration.
2 9
 Because most of the information we have at our disposal covers the period up to 1959-1960, the
answer to this question is based essentially on the first ten years of the ECE experience.
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concerning the content and the general orientation of research are within
the sole competence of the Secretariat. The Executive Secretary and his staff
are always ready to serve member governments by preparing studies at their
request, but he alone is responsible for the content of such studies and for
the final decision to publish them. During the first ten years of the Commis-
sion's existence, attempts were made to take this initiative away from the
Secretariat, but they failed because the Secretariat was able to demonstrate
conclusively that it was to the interest of all to allow an independent group
of international officials to carry out research under its own responsibility.
This "victory" of the Secretariat was possible essentially because of two factors:
the quality of its leadership and its surprising cohesion in the face of outside
attacks. The leadership assumed by Gunnar Myrdal was not only an element
of strength in relations with member governments, but it also represented the
most important single factor in the development of staff loyalty. Such loyalty
would, however, have been precarious had it not been for the relative ideo-
logical cohesion of the staff taken as a whole and of the Research and Plan-
ning Division in particular. Because of this cohesion Myrdal was often criti-
cized for limiting membership on the staff to those economists who agreed
basically with the general orientation of his own thinking. There is no doubt
that the "antiliberal" trends were and still are dominant within the Secretariat,
but it should be said in all fairness that the scientific integrity of its members
has enabled them to maintain such high standards of scientific inquiry as to
avoid the pitfalls of dogmatism.30
Considering the policy orientation of this research and the obligation placed
upon the staff to present its studies as if their conclusions were unanimously
reached, an understanding of the methods of consensus formation in relation
to research projects becomes an essential part of any attempt to study the func-
tioning of the Secretariat. At the risk of oversimplifying a very complex proc-
ess we could describe it by saying that it is based on the application of the
principles of dialectic confrontation at the various echelons of the decision-
making scale. In cases of persistent disagreement among members of the staff
the opinion of the officer particularly responsible for the specific project is
regarded as having special weight. If, however, all means of dialectic con-
frontation are exhausted without reaching agreement, then the findings which
remain controversial are presented "in a subdued way." It should also be added
30
 David Wightman has written that
there is one important factor making for cohesion, namely a measure of homogeneity in political
outlook on current economic problems. As each member of the Division has already rejected or
embraced certain broad approaches no time is lost in wrangling over fundamental questions of
principle, such as the merits or demerits of free trade. In this sense, and in this sense alone,
appointments to the Division are partly political in character.
(Economic Co-operation in Europe. A Study of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
[London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1956], pp. 69-70.)
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196 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
that on some occasions the Executive Secretary has decided to permit two
different divisions to present opposing views on the same issue.31
The Ad Hoc Diplomatic Activities of the Secretariat
The last category of executive activities that should be mentioned includes
all those initiatives undertaken by the Secretariat independently of any spe-
cific provisions of the Terms of Reference or the Rules of Procedure and as a
result of which it becomes temporarily and in a limited sector a "partner" of
member governments in the conduct of their diplomatic relations. On the
basis of the Commission's general objectives laid down in the Terms of Refer-
ence and in subsequent resolutions the first Executive Secretary believed that
every time governments were willing to let the Secretariat act, it was his duty
to take initiatives in this field and to do so within the limits implicitly or
explicitly set by them. Under this general category we can distinguish three
types of initiatives:
1) On several occasions the Secretariat has attempted and often succeeded
in breaking a diplomatic deadlock by offering member governments the possi-
bility of resuming negotiations within an ad hoc procedural framework under
the formal cover of consultations pursued by the Executive Secretary. These
consultation techniques were developed in the years 1950-1954 in relation to
the Secretariat's efforts aiming at the resumption and development of East-
West trade. In taking such initiatives the Secretariat went beyond the limits
of its functions of preparing, convening, and participating in ordinary meet-
ings of multilateral bodies because it attempted to act as the "honest broker"
whose action was to bring about the resumption of negotiations which were
interrupted as a result of serious political difficulties.
In November 1950 and in August 1951 the Executive Secretary held two
such consultations, the first one on the availability of grains and the second
on grains and timber as well as on counterpart products. The first resolution
calling on the Executive Secretary to pursue his efforts in this field was
adopted during the Commission's seventh session in the spring of 1952.32 In
the meantime, however, the general pattern of these consultations had been
established and the Commission simply expressed its satisfaction and approval
of the Executive Secretary's action. We consider this action to be diplomatic
in character because the Secretariat went beyond the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission's subsidiary bodies by proposing to member governments certain ad hoc
procedures through which, it was felt, the deadlock in the Committee on the
Development of Trade would eventually be broken. In doing this, the Secre-
3 1
 Such opposing views were presented in 1949 by the Steel and the Research and Planning Divisions.
For a brief discussion of these methods of consensus formation, see UN Document E/EQE/291, Chapter
14, pp. 8-9.
32
 Economic and Social Council Official Records (14th session), Supplement No. 5, p. 21.
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THE ECE SECRETARIAT AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION I 9 7
tariat was pursuing its policy objectives in the field of trade by inviting quali-
fied representatives of European governments—and this included several non-
members—to meet under its auspices in an attempt to break this deadlock.
The diplomatic techniques developed in relation to these meetings can be
briefly described as follows: (a) The Executive Secretary invited governments
to send qualified experts to consult with him on problems related to the de-
velopment of trade. At the first meeting the experts simply "exchanged in-
formation" in a "businesslike manner." At a second stage, nine months later,
the experts were encouraged to consider the possibility of opening bilateral
discussions on "concrete trading proposals." As a result of the August 1951
consultation, however, Myrdal did not feel sufficiently encouraged to convene
a full-fledged meeting of trade experts. Realizing that governments had started
showing a real interest in the resumed dialogue on trade, the Executive Secre-
tary preferred to let them take the initiative. It was only after the Commission
during its seventh session had passed the resolution requesting him to convene
such a meeting that Myrdal assumed the initiative once again. In respect to
this resolution and to the subsequent report of ECE to ECOSOC33 it is im-
portant to note that they spelled out the conditions which he considered in-
dispensable if such a meeting was to have any reasonable chances of success.
Subsequently, two large-scale consultations were held in the spring of 1953
and in the spring of 1954, and these in turn opened the way for the resump-
tion of the meetings of the Committee on the Development of Trade in the
fall of 1954. (b) These consultations are not, from a formal point of view,
intergovernmental meetings. In spite of the fact that on many occasions the
national experts were in fact diplomats, the Executive Secretary treated them
as if they were experts "placed at his disposal" by governments and he always
insisted that it was his sole responsibility to determine the agenda as well as
to settle all procedural problems. No resolutions were adopted and at the
end of the meetings it was his responsibility to report to governments, (c)
After a general discussion of intra-European trade the experts were invited
to begin bilateral exploratory talks or trade negotiations if they were prepared
to do so. As a matter of fact, the greater part of these consultations was de-
voted to such bilateral discussions. Although no official records were kept,
members of the Secretariat were often present in their capacity of "honest
brokers" attempting to break the deadlocks by sometimes proposing alterna-
tive solutions.
There is no doubt that these consultations contributed largely to the re-
sumption and development of trade relations between countries of Eastern
and Western Europe. It is naturally very difficult to measure the exact impact
of such a contribution because these deliberations coincided chronologically
with the first "thaw" in the East-West struggle. At this stage we would simply
33
 Economic and Social Council Official Records (14th session), Supplement No. 5.
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
underline that they represent a set of diplomatic techniques enabling an inter-
national secretariat to act at a time when political and procedural deadlocks
paralyze the organization.
2) Within the general context of these consultations the Secretariat at times
went a step further by actually suggesting the content and the form of bi-
lateral agreements. In some cases the Executive Secretary and his staff went
beyond their role of "honest brokers" by proposing specific solutions to prob-
lems which arose essentially as a result of the absence of diplomatic relations
between certain countries. An interesting example of such initiatives may be
found in the resumption of trade relations between Greece and at least two
Eastern European countries, Poland and Hungary. The absence of diplomatic
relations did not altogether exclude the possibility of establishing informal
contacts within the framework of the consultations, but once these talks made
it clear that there was a mutual desire to resume trade relations, the form
that such an agreement could take became the major obstacle to its conclu-
sion. When we consider the traditional lack of imagination of foreign minis-
tries, it becomes obvious that if these negotiations had been handled in a
manner which the ministries considered appropriate, the resumption of trade
between Greece and the Eastern European countries would certainly not have
taken place as early as it did. Fortunately, however, a number of favorable
factors made it possible to overcome the obstacles which resulted from the
absence of diplomatic relations. The personal qualities of the negotiators and
the imaginative work of his staff enabled the Executive Secretary to come up
with some suggestions which led to the conclusion of the first agreements.
The solution finally adopted was that of the signature of agreements between
the Chamber of Commerce of Athens and the Chambers of Foreign Trade of
the two socialist countries. These texts were accompanied by exchanges of
letters between the central banks which established the framework for the
flow of payments.
Such a solution was not to the liking of all foreign ministries concerned
and there were some legal experts who warned that the agreements had no
value whatsoever under international law and that they were not enforceable,
either under international or under municipal law. In fact, they were scru-
pulously observed and they have subsequently served as precedents for the
signature of trade agreements between states which have no diplomatic rela-
tions or which do not recognize each other.
3) The last type of ad hoc diplomatic activities of the Secretariat which we
would like to mention includes those initiatives where it has been involved in
a sustained diplomatic action in pursuance of the Commission's long-term
objectives of European integration. As we have already seen, the research of
the Secretariat inevitably leads to certain policy-oriented conclusions which
are presented in the published studies or in private recommendations to gov-
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THE ECE SECRETARIAT AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION I 9 9
ernments. The work of the staff becomes diplomatic in character when, as a
result of such research, the Executive Secretary decides on a course of action
involving bilateral and multilateral contacts or negotiations with governments
in pursuance of these objectives.
One of the most interesting examples of such action is the leading role as-
sumed by the Secretariat in the "Yougelexport" negotiations which lasted from
1950 to 1957. The starting point of these initiatives was the studies, prepared
soon after the Commission came into existence, on the general subject of a
more rational exploitation of Europe's electric power resources.34 The conclu-
sions drawn from these studies reinforced the Executive Secretary's conviction
that it was the duty of ECE to promote intergovernmental cooperation in the
field of joint or coordinated exploitation of natural resources. When the dele-
gate of the United States to the seventh session of the Electric Power Com-
mittee proposed then the consideration of a previous Secretariat suggestion
concerning the export of the Yugoslav power surplus and the Committee de-
cided to undertake the study of this question, the Executive Secretary asked
his staff to pursue actively the preparation of a study which was already under
way on the transfer of electric power across European borders. At the same
time he decided to convene in the summer of 1951 a meeting between Yugo-
slav and Italian experts in order to examine the possibilities of such trans-
fers between the two countries. Before, during, and after this meeting the
intergovernmental contacts were initiated and presided over by a representative
of the Secretariat who took a very active part in the negotiations. In March
and in June 1952 the Commission and its Electric Power Committee decided
that this project was to be considered as one of top priority and they invited
all interested governments to take part in the discussions pursued under the
auspices of the Secretariat. In December of the same year the Secretariat con-
vened an unofficial meeting of representatives of four interested governments
(Yugoslavia, Austria, Italy, and West Germany) during which it was decided
to establish a group of experts to which would be submitted the studies pre-
pared by the Secretariat before they were transmitted to the Committee. After
that stage the Secretariat's participation in the negotiations became less im-
portant because the governments made it clear that they were interested in
this project and that they wanted their experts to play the leading role.
34
 One of the first such studies to be presented was devoted to the possibilities of exchanging electric
power resources between West Germany, Austria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It was submitted to the
Electric Power Committee at its seventh session in September 1950, but the East-West tension which re-
sulted from the Korean War made it impossible for t ie Committee to consider such a project. Similarly,
in the early fifties, the Secretariat took the initiative in the preparation of the plans and in the nego-
tiations which led in May 1954 to the conclusion of the agreement between Austria and Yugoslavia on
the coordinated exploitation of the resources of the Drava River. We have chosen however to discuss
the Yougelexport project because of the complexity of the problems that were raised and of the impetus
given to the negotiations, at least during their first phase, as a result of the Secretariat's active
participation.
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200 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
The Yougelexport program as it was originally elaborated by the staff and
the national experts never did come to a successful conclusion because of a
number of new developments in the political relations of the four countries
concerned and in the Yugoslav economy itself. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that the diplomatic action of the Secretariat during the initial phases
was one of the driving forces for the successful outcome of the preliminary
contacts which led to the establishment of the intergovernmental bodies.
These efforts finally failed as a result of the subsequent evolution of the re-
gional system, but the initiatives undertaken by the Secretariat deserve our
attention because they are a characteristic example of ad hoc diplomatic action
by an international secretariat.
SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
In our introductory remarks we stated briefly that we consider the integra-
tion of a regional system or of the universal international system as the primary
function of international institutions. This hypothesis is particularly relevant to
any study of international secretariats because the acceptance on the part of
governments of the existence of such bodies and of their right, if not their
duty, to carry out executive activities with reasonable chances of success is a
sure indication of the occurrence of the integrative process either through a
conscious effort at community building or through the unplanned growth of
the coincidence of interest.35 It would not be difficult to find examples of the
ECE Secretariat's conscious efforts at community building, but the participa-
tion of most of the other actors in the European system in this process takes
the form of an unplanned growth of coincidence of interest.
In some very limited sectors of the European economy, consensus formation
has in fact become the "dominant characteristic of interactor relations" al-
though at no time has there been a quantitative "spillover" enabling the Euro-
pean economy taken as a whole to cross the critical threshold beyond which
this characteristic becomes dominant in the sectors which are of vital im-
portance to the various national economies. It would, however, be erroneous to
regard the results already obtained in respect to European integration as
negligible. In appreciating these results we must consider essentially two close-
ly related variables: the quantitative and qualitative impact of integration on
the patterns and content of intra-European economic relations and the effects
of the integrative process on the individual national economies.
To be sure, if one looks at the European economy during the past fifteen
years, the integrative effects of activities carried out within the framework
of the Commission only appear in some limited sectors, such as transport and
trade, but in these sectors the patterns of intra-European relations have been
35
 See above, pp. 177-178.
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decisively affected by the existence of the Commission. The standardization of
technical conditions and of legal prescriptions in the field of inland transport,
the general acceptance by governments of a commercial arbitration conven-
tion, and the standardization of sales conditions in certain basic industrial
branches, as well as the introduction of uniform statistical methods and tech-
niques, undoubtedly represent consequences of the slow process of limited
integration for which ECE has been primarily responsible.
Similarly, this integrative process has affected a number of important na-
tional economic sectors. One of the factors which has been most helpful in
carrying the effects of integration into the realm of day-to-day economic ac-
tivities is the participation of nongovernmental organizations in the work of
practically all the subsidiary organs where the decisions are elaborated and
adopted. The participation of professional organizations in the work of these
bodies gives an added value to their decisions and recommendations and offers
certain guarantees for their implementation by the economic "policy makers"
at the national level. There is a tendency among many political scientists
to take an ironic view of such limited accomplishments of international in-
stitutions as the introduction of the International Road Transport (TIR)
regulations by most European governments. As for those who benefit directly
from the development of uniform road transport regulations, they hardly
ever realize that they are the consequence of initiatives undertaken by the
"bureaucrats" of the Palais des Nations and that they are part of the general
pattern of European integration which has been the major objective pursued
by the ECE Secretariat since 1947.
Although most disputes which have arisen within ECE have been settled
by methods other than that of "upgrading the common interests" of member
states, the Secretariat has consistently attempted to obtain from member gov-
ernments the acceptance of this guiding principle, at least for the settlement
of disputes on matters which are not of vital interest to them. The interna-
tional Secretariat was committed to a set of methods for settling disputes
which are characteristic of the integrative process, but systemic conditions did
not permit their implementation.36
Finally, in spite of its many limitations, we would like to underline the
integrative effects of Secretariat action by reminding the reader of the state
of the regional system during the initial period of the Commission's existence.
The contribution of an international institution to the integrative process
should not simply be measured in absolute terms, leaving aside the state of
36
 We should, however, stress once again that member governments were not always satisfied with
the methods and techniques used by the Secretariat to promote what it considered to be the general
interest of Europe. In determining the content of this general interest Myrdal was always careful to
take into consideration the avowed or implied policies of member states, and he rarely if ever over-
stepped the strict limits imposed upon his action by these policies. But, in spite of this caution, the
Secretariat regularly came under fire.
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
00
00
26
17
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
29
:5
4,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
2 0 2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
the systemic environment in which it functions. In appreciating such a con-
tribution we should constantly keep in mind the relation between the state
of the system and the degree of integration attained. In the case of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, its contribution to the integration of the
European economy taken as a whole can be fully understood only if we take
into consideration the high degree of heterogeneity of the regional system
during the greater part of its existence. More specifically, we would like to
suggest that the integrative effects of the Secretariat's action have been im-
portant enough to warrant the statement that it has been for the past seven-
teen years one of the most efficient and politically effective bodies contributing
to the process of the integration of the whole of Europe.
/ have long wor\ed for the cause of United Europe and even of a United States
of Europe, which would enable that continent, the source of so much of our cul-
ture, ancient and modern, and the parent of the New World, to resume and revive
its former splendours. It is my sure hope and conviction that European unity will
be achieved and that it will not ultimately be limited only to the countries at present
composing Western Europe.
From a speech by Winston S. Churchill to the
United States Congress, Washington, D.C., Janu-
ary 17, 1952. (Denise Folliot [ed.], Documents
• on International Affairs 1952 [New York, Oxford
University Press, 1955], p. 51.)
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